The Fifth Amendment at Justice:
A Reply
Stephen J. Schulhofert
Mr. Markman's response to "Reconsidering Miranda" misses
the article's central point, which was to offer a theory of fifth
amendment compulsion and to consider the legitimacy of Miranda
within the framework of that theory. Mr. Markman has no theory,
and he makes no effort to explain why mild pressures and small
financial penalties sometimes constitute compulsion. He invites us
to treat police interrogation as a category unto itself and to hold
permissible some pressures that would be found compelling outside
the custodial setting. He declines even to consider whether his less
protective notion of compulsion is justified by differences in context, though his reason for avoiding comparisons becomes clear
when we spell out those differences. In police interrogation, the
suspect is cut off from communication with any lawyer, friend, or
neutral observer. Questioned in a threatening environment by
those who hold him physically under their control, the suspect "is
painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator."'
While Markman offers no affirmative theory of what compulsion means, we can learn a good deal from his discussion of what
compulsion does not mean. One theory, that compulsion requires a
formal obligation backed by sanctions, was a mainstay of pre-Miranda arguments that the privilege against self-incrimination was
irrelevant to police interrogation. Markman agrees with me that
Miranda's rejection of this theory was "obviously correct" (p.
939).2 Another candidate is the theory that compulsion requires
"physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break
the suspect's will." 3 Again Markman agrees that my rejection of
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this view is "obviously correct" (p. 939). Yet it was precisely this
theory that the Supreme Court invoked to find an absence of compulsion in Elstad, Tucker, and Quarles.4 Markman evidently
agrees with me that the analytical premise of those cases is "obviously [in]correct."
Why, then, does Markman challenge the view of compulsion
offered in Miranda and in my article? The historical materials cannot bear the weight Markman places upon them. He emphasizes
that preliminary examinations of suspects had been "a basic feature of criminal procedure [since the sixteenth century] and remained so until the mid-nineteenth century" (p. 942). But his own
sources stress that the preliminary examination of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries relied upon compulsory process and
often upon torture. The existence of such practices casts no doubt
on my claim that the fifth amendment was intended to prohibit
"pretrial examination by magistrates. . . under formal process" or
other compulsion.' Moreover, mid-nineteenth-century willingness
to tolerate "aggressive" interrogation, with no warnings and no
right to avoid questioning (p. 941), is not helpful in interpreting
the intended content of fifth amendment "compulsion." Turning
again to Markman's own sources, we find that such practices were
either perceived as contrary to the privilege or were reconciled
with it on the sole ground (properly rejected by Markman) that
compulsion required a formal obligation to respond.
Markman dismisses as a creature of "late-nineteenth-century
statutory developments" the defendant's free choice whether to
testify at his trial (p. 940). Under Markman's approach, the criminal defendant would be in the same position as a witness who is
not a criminal suspect: at trial he would have "no [constitutional]
4 Id.; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-46 (1974); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984).
5 See E. M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 18
(1949).
1 Schulhofer at 438 (emphasis added).
7 The New York practice, for example, is colored by the fact that New York did not
adopt a privilege against self-incrimination until the mid-nineteenth century; some authorities describe the New York courts of the earlier period as "indifferen[t]" to the privilege.
See Morgan, 34 Minn. L. Rev. at 22-23 & n.88 (cited in note 5). Markman's reliance on
Mayers is similarly problematic. Mayers explains:
[I]t was considered entirely consistent with [the fifth amendment] for the committing
magistrate to question the prisoner.... [He was] not required to swear to tell the
truth and [was] not punishable for refusing to answer.. . . [B]eing threatened neither
with a prosecution for perjury nor with one for contempt, he could not be said to be
"compelled" to be a "witness against himself."
Lewis Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? 223-24 (1959).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:950

right to prevent questioning and may be presented with very substantial incentives to respond" (p. 940). The nearly universal understanding of the fifth amendment is diametrically opposed to
this view.'
Markman thinks that the practice of questioning under subpoena a targeted grand jury witness or suspected accomplice is evidence against my claim that any pressure "imposed for the purpose of discouraging the silence of a criminal suspect constitutes
prohibited compulsion" (p. 939).' But as he knows, such a witness
cannot be "required to answer over his valid claim of the privilege." 1 0 The right to claim the privilege could hardly arise if such a
witness were not facing "compulsion."
Miranda requires that once a suspect does claim the privilege,
all questioning must cease. Markman considers this rule anomalous because he assumes that outside the custodial context, the
fifth amendment gives witnesses "no right to prevent questioning"
(p. 940). The fact that the fifth amendment sometimes provides
more protection in custodial interrogation than elsewhere should
not be surprising, in light of the unusual vulnerability of the suspect in custody.1 1 But in regard to the right to prevent questioning,
Markman's assumption about the rule applied in noncustodial settings is mistaken. When further questioning is permitted after a
witness invokes the privilege, it is usually because the witness, if he
is not the focus of the investigation, will have no privilege with
respect to subsequent, non-incriminating questions. With respect
to potentially incriminating questions, Markman's claim that a
witness "validly asserting the fifth amendment right . . . has no
right to prevent further questioning" (p. 940 n.5) is simply incorrect. Namet v. United States, which he cites in support of that
proposition, says precisely the opposite. 12 And in informal, noncus8
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373 U.S. 179 (1963). In Namet, the prosecutor questioned two witnesses (Mr. and

Mrs. Kahn) about certain matters relating to the defendant, even though their counsel had
warned that the Kahns would claim the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court affirmed the conviction, but its opinion in no way suggested that continued questioning of the
Kahns had been proper. On the contrary, the decision rested on the facts that the prosecutor properly planned to question them about unprivilegedmatters, that very few questions
touched on privileged areas, that the defense had failed to object, and that there was little,
if any, prejudice. The Court wrote:
In the course of eliciting this and other relevant [nonprivileged] testimony, the prosecutor asked only four questions held to be privileged. We cannot find that these few
lapses, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, amounted to planned or deliber-
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todial interviews, a witness who asserts the fifth amendment can
prevent further questioning by simply invoking his right to walk
away.
Markman's refusal to recognize any "right to prevent questioning" leads him to find no constitutional violation in Edwards v.
Arizona (pp. 947-48).Y The defendant there invoked his privilege

and refused to submit to questioning, but a sheriff told him that he
"had to." Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[t]his is enough for
me,' 1 4 but it would not be enough under Markman's unstated the-

ory of compulsion. Proscribed compulsion apparently must be
more than persistent, unwanted questioning, more than use of "the
threat of criminal punishment. .. 'for the purpose of discouraging
• . . silence'" (p. 939),15 and more than "very substantial incentives to respond" (p. 940), but it need not "break the will."
Markman's essay, like the Justice Department's 120-page report,
nowhere suggests how to walk this constitutional tightrope.
Even under an acceptable theory of compulsion, not every unwarned custodial statement is compelled. My article explains when
the Court's constitutional role permits (and sometimes requires)
adoption of an irrebuttable presumption and why police interrogation without warnings calls for an irrebuttable presumption of
compulsion. Markman emphatically rejects my conclusions. But he
does not confront my arguments or examples. Since he regards irrebuttable presumptions in constitutional law as invariably illegitimate, he could find nothing automatically compelling about 36
hours of continuous interrogation or questioning accompanied by a
few slaps or kicks. And this decision principle would join a substantive standard that allows "very substantial" incentives to discourage silence and denies the suspect any right to cut off questioning. The practical impact of that approach makes it easy to see
why, just last year, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "the
[Miranda] decision as written strikes the proper balance between
ate attempts by the Government to make capital out of witnesses' refusals to testify.
We are particularly reluctant to fasten such motives on the Government's conduct
when, as here, defense counsel not only failed to object on behalf of the defendant, but
in many instances actually acquiesced in the procedure as soon as the rights of the
witnesses were secured. Nor can we find that the few invocations of privilege by the
Kahns were of such significance in the trial that they constituted reversible error even
in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct. The effect of these questions was minimized by the lengthy nonprivileged testimony which the Kahns gave.
373 U.S. at 189 (emphasis added).
:3 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
" Id. at 488 (concurrence).
15Quoting Schulhofer, U. Chi. L. Rev. at 445 (cited in note 2).
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society's legitimate law enforcement interests and the protection of
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights."'"
Markman's renewed claims about damage to law enforcement
do nothing to bolster the weaknesses of his office's original report.
The "calculating criminal who eagerly enters into conversations
with the police . . . [and] the contrite criminal who freely gives a
full confession" (p. 942) will continue to do so after being warned
of their rights. Some suspects who thought themselves obliged to
respond will not talk after receiving warnings, and so the confession rate presumably will fall. But fewer confessions (a consequence of the fifth amendment that the framers undoubtedly anticipated) damage law enforcement only if other, equally
persuasive evidence of guilt is unavailable. Apparently, this is seldom the case because, as my article stressed, falling confession
rates have not significantly reduced clearance and conviction
rates. 17 In addition, more careful investigation (spurred on by Miranda's limits on interrogation) sometimes produces even stronger
evidence. For these reasons, support for Miranda runs high even in
the law enforcement community, and news stories about police reaction to the Justice Department report have carried such headlines as "Police Chiefs Defend Miranda Against Meese Threats"
and "Ed Meese's War on Miranda Draws Scant Support."' 8
Markman chides me for not spelling out my methodological
criticisms of the New York and Philadelphia studies that purport
to show damage to law enforcement. The weaknesses of the New
York study are transparent. A summary of its findings states that
49 percent of defendants confessed before Miranda and only 15
percent afterwards, but in fact the study tabulated only the number of confessions "used in presenting cases to [the] grand jury,"
not the number of confessions obtained.' 9 Although confessions
"eMoran

v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1143 (1986). Markman suggests (p. 943) that Mi-

randa's irrebuttable presumption theory was rejected by the Court in Elstad, 470 U.S. at
306-07 n.1. Markman's reliance on this passage is unfathomable. The cited footnote stresses
the Court's approval of the irrebuttable presumption concept: "A Miranda violation does
not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements."
"7 See authorities cited in Schulhofer at 456 nn.52-54, 457-58 nn.58-59, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. "cited in note 2". Markman correctly cautions that conviction rates alone cannot provide an airtight measure of Miranda's law enforcement impact (p. 946-47 n.20). I noted the
same caveat in my article. See Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 458 n.59 (cited in note 2).
But when conviction rates, clearance rates, and the impressions of law enforcement officers
in the field are considered together, a reasonably reliable picture emerges.
'8 See Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 456 n.53 (cited in note 2).
9 Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
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"could be presented ' 2° in only 15 percent of the post-Miranda
cases, this figure is readily explained by Miranda's partial retroactivity, which prevented use of nearly all pre-Miranda confessions
in the immediate post-Miranda period. 1
The shortcomings of the Philadelphia study, though less obvious, have long been well-documented:2 2 it did not cover all arrestees and did not explain its sampling procedure; the police did
not record the number of suspects who gave statements but only
those who refused;23 and the study took no account of changing
24
arrest patterns, which rendered its conclusions "speculative.
When Markman asks us to believe that those who deny Miranda's
damage to law enforcement-including Chief Justice Warren Burger, Justice Tom Clark, FBI Director Clarence Kelly, Republican
Senator Arlen Specter, and the chief of police in Pittsburgh 2 S-are
blinded by "ideological affinities for Miranda" (p. 8), we are entitled to be skeptical.
Markman's final claim is that overruling Miranda would pave
the way for "far more effective protection" for the suspect (p. 9).
Of course, the Miranda opinion emphasizes that an equally effective legislative solution would be an acceptable substitute for its
approach. 2 Thus, Markman remains free to pursue reform without
seeking Miranda's demise as a prerequisite. His real objective,
stated candidly in his office's report, is not to give suspects "far
more effective protection" but rather to assail Miranda's"symbolic
status" and to "repudiate [the] discredited criminal jurisprudence"
of the Warren Court.27 While Markman correctly observes that for
Cong., 1st Sess. at 1120 (1967) (statement of Frank Hogan, former New York County District Attorney).
20 Id. (emphasis added).
2 Markman attempts to paper over this fatal defect in the New York study; he asks us
to assume that prosecutors presented the inadmissible confessions to the grand jury because

federal decisions would not have prevented them from doing so (p. 946 n. 19). But the New

York rules applicable in 1966 clearly provided that "[t]he grand jury can receive none but
legal evidence." N.Y. Code Crim. Pro. § 249 (1958) (superseded by N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law
§ 190.30(1), effective Sept. 1, 1971). See People v. Fleischmann, 250 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct.

1964) (dismissing indictment that rested on inadmissible confession).
212 See Harold E. Pepinsky, A Theory of Police Reaction to Miranda v. Arizona, 16
Crime & Delinquency 379, 382-83 (1970).
23 Refusal rates may have risen because more suspects were asked (perhaps perfunctorily) to give statements.

1, Pepinsky, 16 Crime & Delinquency at 383 (cited in note 22).
25 See Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 456-58 & n.59 (cited in note 2).
26 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
27 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General
on the Law of Pre-trial Interrogation 115 (Feb. 12, 1986).
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the past 20 years legislatures have been unwilling to enact interrogation reforms with Miranda on the books, the experience of the
previous 150 years shows that such reforms will not occur without
a decision like Miranda.
Markman deserves credit for closing his article with a discussion of the right issue-the need for effective protection of the suspect. Unfortunately, after giving so much attention to problematic
evidence of damage to law enforcement, he gives none to the dramatic, well-documented evidence of interrogation violence that
persists to this day.28 A particularly horrifying example was reported in recent weeks by the Illinois Supreme Court.2 9 Of course,
I know that Markman does not approve of police brutality, and
that it would remain illegal even without Miranda.But Miranda is
not irrelevant to the incidence of serious physical abuse. Brutal interrogation tactics persist even under a regime that forcefully instructs officers to cease questioning whenever the suspect invokes
his right to silence. What would occur if officers were told that it
was legal (and perhaps therefore their duty) to use all pressures
short of actually "breaking the will," or if they were told, in
Markman's formulation, that the suspect has no right to prevent
interrogation and can be subjected to "aggressive" questioning
with "very substantial incentives to respond"?
Miranda is not only sound as a matter of the fifth amendment
concept of compulsion. Miranda remains a crucial tool for safeguarding the dignity and physical safety of the suspect, a goal that
police administrators and responsible Justice Department officials
surely share.

28 See Schulhofer, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 448 n.26 (cited in note 2).
29 People v. Wilson, 116 1Il.2d 29 (1987) (suspect, severely beaten and bound to radia-

tor, suffered second-degree burns, numerous contusions, and injury to one eye).

